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Private Governance, Public Implications and the Tightrope of Regulatory Reform: The ISDA Credit 
Derivatives Determinations Committees* 
 






Regulatory relationships in financial markets exemplify the importance and changing nature of 
transnational business governance interactions (TBGI). These interactions involve reciprocal forces of 
influence between private and public regulators. This paper examines one key case of private 
governance in financial markets: the emergence, structures and decision-making of Credit 
Derivatives Determinations Committees (DCs) of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA).  The paper highlights the mechanisms or ‘pathways’ of interaction between ISDA, 
governments, courts and public regulators. Interactions between state and non-state actors are 
shown to occur in both operational and policy spheres.  ISDA is found to be a particularly resilient 
private regulator in an environment subject both to the significant external shock of the global 
financial crisis and intense pressure on governmental actors to demonstrate that they are 
counteracting risk. The reasons behind ISDA’s adaptive capacities are considered.   
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I.  Introduction: Context of Private Power in Financial Markets 
Markets for financing personal, corporate and governmental activity became a central feature of 
economic life in the industrial and post-industrial age. During the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, measures of liberalization in regulatory oversight of those markets were accompanied by a 
heightened degree of complexity in transactions, as banks and other entities increasingly deployed a 
wider range of instruments and operated across national borders. A conjunction of factors related to 
these trends culminated in the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008 and, arguably, a continuing 
banking and fiscal crisis within the Eurozone.1 
The nature and appropriateness of both governmental and business power in the governance 
arrangements for these markets is contested. To those who argued that light touch regulation of 
financial markets tended to remove the state from a key role, there is a reminder that state activity 
is necessarily constitutive of private market activity generally; and in financial markets in particular.2 
Those who blamed the GFC on excessive dependence on self-regulation, and expected private 
governance to be replaced with public regulation at every turn have had their expectations defied. 
There is evidence of the continuing importance of private regulation across key aspects of financial 
behaviour. Hence, the relationship between businesses and governments in the regulation of 
transnational financial markets has changed, but not necessarily with the effect of excluding 
businesses and their associations from regulatory roles.3 
The GFC has shown up and demanded greater scrutiny of private governance arrangements, and 
also created a dynamic within which certain of these arrangements have been questioned. There has 
thus been a degree of movement towards greater governmental and inter-governmental activity in 
indirect monitoring of private regulation, as well as direct regulation of markets; notably over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives.4 Accordingly, this has resulted in a substantial re-engagement of public 
supervisory authorities with these financial instruments; including, for instance, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)5 and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)6 in the US, as 
well as the European Commission7 and Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)8 in the EU. Public authorities 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., A. Mody and D. Sandri, The Eurozone Crisis: How Banks and Sovereigns Came to be Joined at the Hip 
(IMF Working Paper 11/269, November 2011): available online at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11269.pdf; R. Martin, ‘The Local Geographies of the 
Financial Crisis: From the Housing Bubble to Economic Recession and Beyond’ (2011) 11 Journal of Economic 
Geography 587; L. Story, L. Thomas and N.D. Schwartz, ‘Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt Fuelling Europe’s Crisis’, 
New York Times (13 February 2010); B. Balzli, ‘How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask Its True Debt’, 
Spiegel Online International (2 August 2010): available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/greek-
debt-crisis-how-goldman-sachs-helped-greece-to-mask-its-true-debt-a-676634.html.  
2 C. Shearing, ‘A Constitutive Conception of Regulation’ in Business Regulation in Australia’s 
Future, eds J. Braithwaite and P. Grabosky (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003); L. Rethel and 
T. Sinclair, The Problem with Banks (London: Zed Books, 2012). 
3 See, e.g., A. Nölke and J. Perry, ‘The Power of Transnational Private Governance: Financialization and the 
IASB’ (2007) 9 Business and Politics (Article 4). 
4 See, e.g., S. Pagliari, ‘Who Governs Finance? The Shifting Public-Private Divide in the Regulation of 
Derivatives, Rating Agencies and Hedge Funds’ (2011) 18 European Law Journal 44. 
5 [http://www.cftc.gov/index.htm].  
6 [http://www.sec.gov/].  
7 [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/derivatives/].  
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from major jurisdictions are also attempting to coordinate cross-border implementation of reforms, 
for example through the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group (ODSG)9, OTC Derivatives Regulators 
Forum (ODRF)10 and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).11 This 
coordination is partly driven by concerns regarding the potential for fragmentation and arbitrage to 
emerging derivative markets (‘EDMs’) and ‘offshore’ jurisdictions.12 
In this context, regulatory relationships in financial markets exemplify the importance and changing 
nature of transnational business governance interactions (TBGI) which, centrally, extend beyond 
state regulation of market actors, to interaction with transnational private regulatory13 
arrangements established and operated by industry actors. This interaction involves, but is not 
limited to, governmental scrutiny of private governance arrangements. Indeed, in some regimes 
governments are themselves subjects rather than overseers of private governance. In this paper we 
examine one key case of private governance in financial markets: the emergence, structures and 
decision-making of Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees (DCs) of the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA).   
The DCs are of particular significance because their role extends beyond the more common 
standard-setting functions exhibited by many private bodies within transnational regulatory regimes, 
to embrace key aspects of interpretation and implementation. The DCs determine when ‘credit 
events’ under CDS contracts have occurred, triggering a stream of payments, payable only if such 
events occur. These decisions can profoundly affect the financial positions both of larger corporate 
actors and of states, as well as the banks which fund them. Therefore, the emergence and 
implications of the DCs will be the key focus of this chapter, although the broader context within 
which the DCs were established and operate will also be reviewed, as it offers panoply of instructive 
examples of TBGI within a single regulatory regime. 
II. ISDA, Pathways of Interaction and the Impact of the GFC  
The governance of OTC derivatives transactions has grown to be a key example of transnational 
business governance interactions (TBGI) in which the requirements of market actors for a degree of 
coordination so as to reduce transaction costs has been met by a form of private standard-setting; 
with a wider structure of activity associated with the implementation of the standards, and with 
some dynamic engagement of public authorities in oversight and steering.14 Therefore, this paper 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8 The ESAs comprise the European Banking Authority (EBA) [http://eba.europa.eu/Home.aspx]; European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) [https://eiopa.europa.eu/]; and European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) [http://www.esma.europa.eu/].  
9 [http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html].  
10 [http://www.otcdrf.org/].  
11 [http://www.iosco.org/].  
12 See, e.g., C.A. Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Dodd-Frank: The Implications of 
Global US OTC Derivatives Regulation (University of Utah College of Law Working Paper No 16, 30 October 
2012): available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169401; T. Rixen, ‘Why Reregulation 
After the Crisis is Feeble: Shadow Banking, Offshore Financial Centres, and Jurisdictional Competition’, 
Regulation & Governance (forthcoming). 
13 On transnational private regulation (TPR) generally see, C. Scott, F. Cafaggi and L. Senden, ‘The Conceptual 
and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 1. 
14 B. Eberlien et al.,  ‘Interactions in Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualizing a 
Terrain’ (2013) Regulation & Governance (forthcoming). 
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will highlight the following mechanisms or ‘pathways’ of interaction between the relevant actors, 
encompassing ISDA, governments, courts and public regulators: 
- ISDA’s standard-setting through the Master Agreement and associated documentation; 
- ISDA’s lobbying and other activities in support of the Master Agreement and attempts to 
shape the broader regulatory regime for OTC derivatives; 
- ISDA’s intervention as amicus curiae in court cases involving the Master Agreement and that 
raise important policy issues for ISDA; 
- ISDA’s advisory role, including to sovereigns, on systemically important events in the OTC 
derivatives markets; and  
- Of key interest in this paper, ISDA’s central role in reforming settlement mechanisms in the 
CDS market following the GFC, notably with the encouragement of public actors; resulting in 
ISDA itself maintaining a key regulatory role in this space. 
Before moving to consider these pathways of interaction, we outline the direction of growth and 
significance of the markets in derivatives transactions for context. We will then consider in greater 
detail the governance opportunity which led to the emergence of the peak private governance 
organisation: ISDA. 
a) Growth and Changing Purposes of Derivative Transactions 
Derivative instruments have been defined as agreements between two counterparties where: 
‘the payoffs to and from each counterparty depend on the outcome of one or more extrinsic, future, 
uncertain events or metrics – that is, they are “aleatory contracts” – and in which one counterparty expects 
such outcome to be opposite to that expected by the other counterparty’.15 
Derivatives proliferate in form but share at least one commonality in that they embody a value 
which is intrinsically linked or contingent upon some external item of worth; hence they ‘derive’ 
their value from something else, referred to as the ‘underlying’.16 Depending on the type of 
derivative, the underlying can be a broad range of instruments. These include stocks, bonds, 
currencies, interest rates, energy, commodities, the weather,17 and mortality rates,18 for example.  
Of particular interest for the purposes of this chapter are derivatives which are contingent on third 
party or instrument credit quality,19 specifically credit default swaps (CDS). Put simply, in a CDS a 
‘protection buyer’ makes periodic payments (‘premium’) to a ‘protection seller’ who undertakes to 
compensate the protection buyer in the event of a relevant ‘credit event’ (e.g. bankruptcy, 
restructuring) occurring in relation to the underlying reference entity. A reference entity can be a 
                                                          
15 T.E. Lynch, ‘Derivatives: A Twenty First Century Understanding’ (2011) 43 Loyola University Chicago Law 
Journal 1, at 14. 
16 See generally N.M. Feder, ‘Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives’ (2002) 3 Columbia Business Law 
Review 677.  
17 See, e.g., S. Randalls, ‘Weather Profits: Weather Derivatives and the Commercialisation of Meteorology’ 
(2010) 40 Social Studies of Science 705. 
18 See, e.g., J.K. Hance, ‘Derivatives at Bankruptcy: Lifesaving Knowledge for the Small Firm’ (2008) 65 
Washington & Lee Law Review 711, at 726. 
19 See, e.g., F. Partnoy and D.A. Skeel Jnr., ‘The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives’ (2007) 75 University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 1019. 
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single corporation or sovereign (‘single-name CDS’) or a portfolio of reference entities.20 As well as 
offering the possibility to hedge credit exposure to an underlying reference entity, CDS positions can 
also effectively act as proxies for adopting speculative positions on relative price movements in 
underlying reference bonds.21 
CDSs are of relatively recent vintage. But other derivatives have been deployed throughout history22 
and from at least the 15th century certain of them have been traded on organised ‘exchanges’.23 
Derivatives exchanges are central venues which facilitate transactions in relatively standardised 
instruments, such as options and futures. Major derivatives exchanges have historically been self-
regulatory organisations (SROs) and have also become subject to a degree of direct public regulatory 
oversight over time.24 Notably, exchange-traded derivatives markets have developed a robust 
market infrastructure, exemplified by the utilisation of central clearinghouses (‘CCPs’) to 
intermediate transactions and dampen risks25 (to which we will return later in this chapter). 
Throughout history privately negotiated tailored (‘bespoke’) derivatives have also been traded in the 
shadow of organised exchanges on an ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) basis. Initially, the common law and 
statutory provisions in major trading jurisdictions were inhospitable to these instruments, largely 
due to their perceived propensity to inflate speculative bubbles and facilitate significant losses with 
potentially wider implications.26 Moralistic concerns also stoked suspicion of these instruments in 
earlier periods.27 Once public policy towards OTC derivatives, particularly the burgeoning swaps 
market,28 softened in the late twentieth century, they were initially invoked occasionally to fulfil 
niche hedging strategies. However, this altered significantly throughout the 1990s and 2000s when 
OTC instruments, including CDSs, became widely traded29 or ‘commodified’ in their own right, in 
pursuit of purely speculative30 activities and regulatory arbitrage.31 In turn, this was a driver of the 
GFC. 
                                                          
20 See, generally, H.B. Shadab, ‘Guilty By Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps’ (2010) 4 
Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 407. 
21 See, generally, IOSCO, Report on the Credit Default Swap Market (June 2012): available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD385.pdf  
22 See, e.g., E.J. Swan, Building the Global Market: A 4000 Year History of Derivatives (London: Kluwer, 2000).   
23 See, e.g., M. D. West, ‘Private Ordering at the World’s First Futures Exchange’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law 
Review 2574.   
24 See, e.g., G. Poitras, ‘From Antwerp to Chicago: The History of Exchange-Traded Derivative Security 
Contracts’ (2009) 20 Revue d'Histoire de Sciences Humaines (2009) 11; S.C. Pirrong, ‘The Self-Regulation of 
Commodity Exchanges: The Case of Market Manipulation’ (1995) 38 Journal of Law and Economics 141.   
25 See, e.g., F.R. Edwards, ‘The Clearing Association in Futures Markets: Guarantor and Regulator’, 3 Journal of 
Futures Markets (1983) p. 369.   
26 B. Sapien, ‘Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Bucket Shops to Credit Default Swaps’ (2010) 19 
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 411; L.A. Stout, ‘Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation 
and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives’ (1999) 48 Duke Law Journal 701. 
27 J. P. Raines and C.G. Leathers, ‘Financial Derivative Instruments and Social Ethics’ (1994) 13 Journal of 
Business Ethics 197; S. Borna and J. Lowry, ‘Gambling and Speculation’ (1987) 6 Journal of Business Ethics 219. 
28 See, e.g., R. Hodgson, ‘The Birth of the Swap’ (2009) 65 Financial Analysts Journal 1.   
29 See, e.g., D. Bryan and M. Rafferty, ‘Financial Derivatives: The New Gold?’ (2006) 10 Competition and 
Change 265. 
30 On pure speculation in OTC derivatives markets see, e.g., T.E. Lynch, ‘Gambling by Another Name; The 
Challenge of Purely Speculative Derivatives’ (2011) 17 Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance 67; Stout 
above n. 26. 
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Today, the OTC derivative markets are populated by sophisticated participants. These include the 
largest global dealer banks (‘G16’) on the ‘sell side’,32 as well as institutional investors, financial 
institutions, governmental entities and, to some extent, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
high net worth individuals on the ‘buy side’.  Specifically in relation to the CDS market, it has been 
estimated by IOSCO that, as of June 2012:  
‘[R]oughly 60% of the outstanding contracts (in terms of gross notional) are concluded between 
dealers...while the remaining share is represented by contracts between a dealer and a non-dealer – 
mostly financial – institutions’.33  
Intermediaries, such as inter-dealer brokers, and professional services firms, including the major law 
and accountancy houses, also play important supporting roles in the OTC derivative markets in 
general. 
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) the OTC (including CDS) market is 
considerably larger than the exchange-traded (ET) segment in notional terms34, though it must also 
be emphasised that headline notional measurements do not reflect mark-to-market and ‘netting’-
related adjustments, coupled with collateralisation; which together generate a smaller ‘net notional’ 
figure.35 Nonetheless, the OTC derivative markets, and the key players within them, are systemically 
significant36 and immediately prior to the GFC they were susceptible to less direct public regulatory 
oversight than the ET segment.37 In particular, the OTC derivatives markets generally lacked the well-
developed market infrastructure, such as central clearing,38 which characterised the ET segment. 
Instead, from the 1980s until the GFC OTC derivative market participants primarily relied upon a 
dominant transnational private regulator across key jurisdictions under the auspices of ISDA39; albeit 
a private regulatory regime that has historically been, and is perhaps even more so now, clearly 
dependent upon the ‘enrolment’40 of public capacities. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
31 See, e.g., G. Tett, Fools Gold: How Unrestrained Greed Corrupted a Dream, Shattered Global Markets and 
Unleashed a Catastrophe (London: Little, Brown 2009); F. Partnoy, ‘Financial Derivatives and the Costs of 
Regulatory Arbitrage’ (1997) 22 Journal of Corporation Law 211. On regulatory arbitrage generally see V. 
Fleischer, ‘Regulatory Arbitrage’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review 227.  
32 See, e.g., M. Cameron, ‘G14 Dealer Group Adds Two New Members’, Risk.net (1 December 2011): available 
at http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2127940/g14-dealer-adds . 
33 IOSCO above n. 21, p. 6. 
34 Compare BIS, OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the First Half of 2012 (13 November 2012): available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1211.htm with BIS, Exchange-Traded Derivatives Statistics (18 March 2013): 
available at  http://www.bis.org/statistics/extderiv.htm  
35 See Johnson above n. 12.  
36 See, e.g., A. Blundell-Wignall and P.E. Atkinson, ‘Global SIFIs, Derivatives and Financial Stability’ (2011) OECD 
Journal, Financial Market Trends (Issue 1). On systemic risk more generally see, e.g., S.L. Schwarcz, ‘Systemic 
Risk’ (2008) 97 Georgetown Law Journal 194.  
37 See, e.g., L.A. Stout, ‘The Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis’ (2011) 1 Harvard Business Law Review 301. 
38 See, e.g., C. Pirrong, ‘The Clearinghouse Cure’ (2009) Regulation 44, at 45-46. 
39 For further discussion of ISDA see, e.g., H. McKeen-Edwards and T. Porter, Transnational Financial 
Associations: Assembling Wealth and Power (New York: Routledge 2013). 
40 See J. Black, ‘Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Processes: Examples from UK Financial Services Regulation’ 
(2003) Public Law 62. 
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b) ISDA: Drivers, Mechanisms and Pathways of Interaction 
The regulatory regime within which ISDA operates epitomises the myriad of explicit and implicit 
ways in which TBGI manifests itself in the financial markets. Strictly speaking, ISDA itself (as the 
dominant private regulator) on the one hand, and the broader regulatory regime for OTC derivatives 
on the other, are not one and the same thing. While ISDA is a very significant (if not the most 
significant) actor, the broader regime for OTC derivatives also encompasses many other actors who 
are not ISDA members, such as governments (but who nonetheless have a stake in what ISDA does). 
Interestingly, the role of public actors has been crucial both to underpinning ISDA’s central 
regulatory role, as well as influencing ISDA’s responsibilities and scope of activity in the wake of 
significant market events, such as the GFC.  The next sections will seek to elaborate this point in 
greater detail before moving to consider perhaps one of the most blatant examples of TBGI in this 
area, namely the establishment and functions of the DCs. 
Drivers of ISDA’s Establishment 
ISDA is the principal transnational private trade association and standard-setter for the OTC 
derivatives markets. It was officially founded in the mid-1980s (initially named the International 
Swaps Dealers Association), at a time when new OTC derivative products and pricing models were 
emerging.41 The immediate trigger for ISDA’s formation was apparently an enquiry from the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) regarding the treatment of swap instruments as ‘off-
balance sheet’ items by major dealer banks.42  As such, ISDA was established by, and for, the main 
OTC dealer banks but its membership constituency (now over 800) has since expanded to 
encompass a broad range of other market participants.43 Nevertheless, the ‘primary member’ dealer 
banks have arguably continued to wield the majority of influence within ISDA since its foundation.44  
Aside from concerns regarding the accounting treatment of OTC instruments, one of ISDA’s other 
major early objectives was to defend copyright to an industry-developed standard (‘boilerplate’)45 
contract for OTC derivatives transactions, now known as the ISDA Master Agreement (hereinafter 
‘the Master Agreement’), and related documentation; such as product definitions. The Master 
Agreement was the progeny of a period of bargaining between the major OTC derivative dealer 
banks and was an attempt to boost legal certainty and minimise transaction costs in the relatively 
nascent, but potentially lucrative, OTC financial derivatives markets.46 As a result, the ISDA Master 
                                                          
41 R.C. Merton, ‘Theory of Rational Option Pricing’ (1973) 4 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 
141; F. Black and M. Scholes, ‘The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973) 81 Journal of Political 
Economy 637.   
42 F. Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (Philadelphia: 
PublicAffairs 2009), pp. 43-44. 
43 ISDA, ISDA Members List: available at https://www2.isda.org/membership/members-list/.  
44 See, e.g., R.E. Litan, The Derivatives Dealer’s Club and Derivatives Markets Reform: A Guide for Policy 
Makers, Citizens and Other Interested Parties (Brookings Institute, April 2010): available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/4/07%20derivatives%20litan/0407_derivativ
es_litan.pdf  
45 On boilerplate see, e.g., K.E. Davis, ‘The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate’ (2006) 104 
Michigan Law Review 1075; M. Kahan and M. Klausner, ‘Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”)’, 83 Virginia Law Review (1997) 713.  
46 See, e.g., S.M. Flanagan, ‘The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions within the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association’ (2001) 6 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 211; J.B. Golden, ‘Setting Standards in 
the Evolution of Swap Documentation’ (1994) 13 International Financial Law Review 18.   
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Agreement and related documentation are now the dominant standards for OTC derivatives 
transactions across major trading jurisdictions.47 ISDA’s initial mission also encapsulated lobbying 
activities extending beyond, though ultimately related to, ISDA’s role as vanguard of the Master 
Agreement.  
Faced with a certain degree of public regulatory ambiguity towards new OTC products in the late 
1980s and 1990s in the large US and UK markets,48 and against a politico-economic backdrop 
espousing the efficient markets hypothesis,49 ISDA’s lobbying was salient. Given that ISDA’s 
membership encompasses some of the largest financial institutions on the globe, its influence and 
apparent expertise were duly recognised by public policy makers. Overall, ISDA can be considered to 
have been pivotal in shepherding a public deregulatory trend; climaxing in the late 1990s/early 
2000s with the enactment of ‘OTC derivatives-friendly’ legislation, such as the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (CFMA) in the US for instance.50 ISDA’s influence in this respect has been starkly 
summarised by Frank Partnoy as follows: 
‘Anyone who imagined that members of Congress, or their staffs, drafted laws regarding derivatives would 
have been surprised to peek inside the offices of the House Agriculture Committee during the time 
Congress was considering the CFMA. Instead of seeing members of Congress at work, you would have seen 
Mark Brickell, the lobbyist from ISDA, writing important pieces of the legislation’.51 
ISDA’s mantra, as well as that of its allies in this period, was that OTC derivative markets were niche 
and technical but nonetheless capable of fulfilling generally beneficial economic functions. It was 
posited that a significant degree of direct public regulatory oversight was unwarranted and that 
‘sophisticated’ industry participants were capable of safely self-regulating. The existence of an 
established boilerplate contract, such as the Master Agreement, and related documentation was 
undoubtedly a powerful ‘signal’52 to public actors in this regard. But it must also be stressed that 
ISDA’s stance was deemed credible at the time and attracted considerable support, not least from 
high profile public policy makers.53 
More broadly, ISDA and/or some of its major members have successfully encouraged national 
governments to enact so-called settlement ‘safe harbours’, incorporating exemptions from 
bankruptcy and gaming laws, for OTC derivatives54; with a view to ensuring that ‘close-out netting’55 
                                                          
47 For instance, as of May 2012 85 per cent of credit support documentation in OTC trades used the ISDA 
standard. See ISDA, Margin Survey 2012 (May 2012): available at http://www2.isda.org/functional-
areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/.  
48 See, e.g., D. Awrey, ‘The FSA, Integrated Regulation and the Curious Case of OTC Derivatives’ (2010) 13 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 1. 
49 On efficient capital markets theory see, e.g., E.F. Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work’ (1970) Journal of Finance 383. 
50 See Stout above n. 37; M. Greenberger, ‘Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative 
Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic Economic Destablization Caused by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion 
Dollar Derivatives Market’ (2011) 6 Journal of Business and Technology Law 127. 
51 Partnoy, above n.42, p. 293. 
52 On a similar theme in the context of collective action clauses (CACs) see, A. Gelpern and M. Gulati, ‘Public 
Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study’ (2006) 84 Washington University Law Review 1627.   
53 See, e.g., US Department of the Treasury, Treasury Deputy Secretary Lawrence T. Summers Testimony 
Before the US Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry on the CFTC Concept Release (30 July 
1998), available at: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2616.aspx. 
54 And which can also encompass other instruments, such as repurchase agreements (‘repos’). 
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is legally permissible. ISDA’s (contestable)56 posture is that these safe harbours are crucial for 
guaranteeing legal certainty and thereby underpinning financial stability. Additionally, enactment of 
such legislation is often explicitly or implicitly positioned as being central to ensuring an attractive 
environment for financial services businesses and, in particular, in supporting the growth of OTC 
derivatives markets.57 
It is notable that ISDA offers a ‘model netting law’58 as a template for enactment of such legislation 
and there are clear examples of national legislators having followed the substance, if not the form, 
of this instrument.59 Although ostensibly a ‘technical’ matter, these interactions thus carry strong 
normative undertones.60 Hence, ISDA’s relationship with sovereigns in this respect may constitute 
what Fabrizio Cafaggi has branded ‘ex-post recognised private regulation’.61 Furthermore, through 
its safe harbour legislation project it could be suggested that ISDA has engaged in a certain degree of 
‘private oversight of the public sector’.62 
Related to these activities, ISDA commissions legal opinions for members on the enforceability of its 
Master Agreement and associated collateral (security) arrangements across jurisdictions.63 In fact, 
the deployment of collateral, which aims to secure contracts and mitigate fallout in the event of 
default, has played (and will likely continue to play) a highly significant regulatory role in the OTC 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
55 Defined as ‘a process involving termination of obligations under a contract with a defaulting party and 
subsequent combining of positive and negative replacement values into a single net payable or receivable’ in 
D. Mengle, Close Out Netting and Risk Management in Over-the-Counter-Derivatives (Working Paper, June 
2010): available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1619480; See also P. Werner, The 
Importance of Close Out Netting (ISDA: Research Notes No.1/2010, 2010): available at 
http://www2.isda.org/search?keyword=netting.    
56 See, e.g., A. Blundell-Wignall and P.E. Atkinson, ‘Deleveraging, Traditional Versus Capital Markets Banking 
and the Urgent Need to Separate GSIFI Banks’ (2012) OECD Journal, Financial Market Trends (issue 1), at 33; D. 
Duffie and D.A. Skeel Jnr., A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and 
Repurchase Agreements (University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-02, 
March 2012): available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982095; M.J. Roe, ‘The 
Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator’ (2011) 63 Stanford Law Review 539; S.J. 
Lubben, ‘Repeal the Safe Harbours’ (2010) 18 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 319; Robert R. Bliss & 
George G. Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systematic Risk: Netting, Collateral and Closeout’, (2006) 2 Journal of 
Financial Stability 55. 
57 See, e.g., ISDA, ISDA Submission to Indian Authorities on Consistency of Netting Application to Spur Economic 
Growth (12 October 2012): available at http://www2.isda.org/search?headerSearch=1&keyword=netting. 
58 ISDA, Model Netting Act: available at http://www.isda.org/docproj/model_netting.html  
59 See, e.g., A. Riles, The Transnational Appeal of Formalism: The Case of Japan’s Netting Law (Stanford/Yale 
Junior Faculty Forum Research Paper 00-03, 2000) pp. 29-30: available at 
http://ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=162588 (Japan);  J. Biggins and C. Scott, ‘Public-Private Relations in a 
Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, the State and OTC Derivatives Market Reform’ (2012) 13 
European Business Organization Law Review 307, at 329-332 (Ireland). 
60 See, e.g., Biggins and Scott above n. 59; G. Morgan, ‘Market Formation and Governance in International     
Financial Markets: The Case of OTC Derivatives’ (2008) 61 Human Relations 637. More generally, it has been 
questioned whether even the most technical areas of private governance can ever be free of political  
contestation affecting interests: T. Büthe, and W. Mattli, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization  
of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
61 F. Cafaggi, Rethinking Private Regulation in the European Regulatory Space (European University Institute, 
Working Paper LAW No. 2006/13) pp. 23-24 (paper on file with authors).   
62  C. Scott, ‘Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance’ (2002) 29 
Journal of Law and Society 56-76. 
63 ISDA, Opinions: available at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/opinions/  
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derivatives markets.64 The use of collateral in OTC transactions has been described by Annelise Riles 
as a ‘kind of private constitution for the parties’ ongoing relationship’.65 Other mechanisms invoked 
to underpin the integrity of the ISDA’s private regulatory role include, for instance, choice of law 
clauses and accompanying guidance within the Master Agreement and related documentation. 
These have the clear aim of confining litigation to jurisdictions which are less likely to deliver major 
interpretative shocks to ISDA’s interests.66 ISDA has also increasingly intervened as amicus in court 
cases which are deemed to raise important policy issues for the OTC derivative markets. This role 
has intensified on foot of increased rates of litigation involving the Master Agreement following the 
GFC.67  
Notably, while alternative dispute resolution was not a pervasive mechanism in the OTC derivative 
markets prior to the GFC, it is now reportedly gaining popularity amongst market participants.68 In 
this sphere, ISDA has assumed a key role within a recent high-profile initiative, known as the Panel of 
Recognised International Market Experts in Finance (P.R.I.M.E. Finance).69 Additionally, ISDA 
arguably exerts subtler forms of influence by actively engaging in legal harmonisation initiatives 
encompassing public and private actors, for instance under the auspices of the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT).70 
Aside from this, ISDA has occasionally engaged in other types of activities which have similarly 
influenced the terms of reference within which its standards and norms operate and, in so doing, 
inevitably brought it into close contact with public actors. These activities have also served to 
illustrate the sheer extent of ISDA’s power in the financial markets. For example, Anna Gelpern has 
highlighted an intriguing incident in 1998 whereby the Japanese Government approached ISDA for 
advice in relation to the distressed Long-Term Credit Bank (‘LTCB’).71 Following this approach and 
discussions with the Japanese authorities, ISDA agreed to issue a statement with a view to providing 
clarity and calming the markets in the context of LTCB’s nationalisation. ISDA’s statement has been 
branded by Gelpern as a ‘private “no action letter” of sorts – that pre-empted a rush for the exits’.72 
If such a statement were to be issued by a national government, it could be considered an 
instrument of soft law.  
                                                          
64 See, e.g., ISDA, ISDA Margin Survey 2012 (1 May 2012): available at http://www2.isda.org/functional-
areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/ . 
65 A. Riles, ‘The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State’ 
(2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 605, at 612. 
66 See, e.g., J. Biggins, ‘”Targeted Touchdown” and “Partial Liftoff”: Post Crisis Dispute Resolution in the OTC 
Derivatives Markets and the Challenge for ISDA’ (2012) 13 German Law Journal 1297. See also, e.g., J.P. 
Braithwaite, ‘Standard Form Contracts as Transnational Law: Evidence from the Derivatives Markets’ (2012) 75 
Modern Law Review 779; J. Black and D. Rouch, 'The Development of the Global Markets as Rule-Makers: 
Engagement and Legitimacy' (2008) 2 Law and Financial Markets Review 218. 
67 ISDA, Amicus Briefs: available at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/amicus-
briefs/; J.P. Braithwaite, ‘OTC Derivatives, the Courts and Regulatory Reform’ (2012) 7 Capital Markets Law 
Journal 364, at 367-368.   
68 See, e.g., ISDA, ISDA Publishes the 2013 Arbitration Guide [http://www2.isda.org/news/isda-publishes-the-
2013-isda-arbitration-guide].  
69 [http://www.primefinancedisputes.org/]. For discussion see J. Golden, ‘Judges and Systemic Risk in the 
Financial Markets’ (2013) 18 Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 327.  
70 UNIDROIT, Principles and Rules on the Netting of Financial Instruments: available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/studies/study78c/main.htm  
71 A. Gelpern, ‘Commentary: Public Promises and Organizational Agendas’ (2009) 51 Arizona Law Review 57 
72 Ibid., at 61. 
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c) ISDA’s Emergence as the Dominant Private Force: Taking Stock 
At this juncture and in view of the preceding analysis, it is worth reflecting on the factors that may 
have been important in cementing ISDA’s role as the dominant private regulator within the broader 
regulatory regime for OTC derivatives. In analysing this, it is instructive to consider ISDA’s role in 
comparative perspective, specifically with reference to Tim Büthe’s extrapolation of the reasons for 
the emergence and solidification of another technical regulator, the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC); a key standard-setter for electrical, electronic and related technologies.73  It is 
clear that the emergence and embedment of ISDA and the IEC share many parallels. Both were 
founded early in the development of their respective industries, which was important to both in 
establishing themselves as ‘focal’ regulators.74  
Furthermore, both ISDA and the IEC underpinned their dominant positions by emphasising their 
technical expertise. As highlighted by Büthe, in reference to the work of Thomas Risse, such 
technical expertise can fulfil important functions for regulators, promoting their legitimacy in the 
eyes of other stakeholders. In particular, such technical expertise can ‘at least allow for 
persuasion...and appear a-political’.75 Aside from the IEC, this logic can also be neatly applied to 
certain of ISDA’s activities. For instance, ISDA has deployed its expertise to develop a highly regarded 
standard-form contract (the Master Agreement). This stock of perceived technical expertise has, in 
turn, also lent weight to ISDA’s (ostensibly a-political) position on the importance of ensuring legal 
enforceability for close-out netting (‘safe harbours’) across jurisdictions. ISDA has justified this on 
technical (legal and risk-based) grounds, notwithstanding the distributional (third party) effects such 
safe harbours may potentially imply.76 
Over time, ISDA’s perceived technical expertise in these areas has rendered it a natural advisor on 
broader systemically important developments in the OTC derivatives markets, including those which 
have attracted the attention of sovereigns; as exemplified in the Japanese LTCB incident and as will 
be highlighted further below in relation to the post-GFC deliberations of public regulators in major 
OTC derivative jurisdictions. Similar to the IEC, it is difficult to argue that ISDA has not actively sought 
pre-eminence. In fact, there is ample evidence that ISDA has explicitly done so, especially given that 
ISDA’s lobbying positions frequently equate optimal outcomes in the OTC derivatives markets with 
adherence to ISDA’s own standards and norms.77  
Therefore, the range of ISDA’s activities has, as Tony Porter has suggested elsewhere, rendered it 
very difficult for another private challenger to compete with it.78 Where such challenges have 
materialised in the past, ISDA has actively grappled with them.79 It is, for the reasons outlined above, 
                                                          
73 T. Büthe, ‘Engineering Uncontestedness? The Origins and Institutional Development of the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)’ (2010) 12 Business and Politics (Article 4). 
74 Ibid., at 11. 
75 Ibid.  
76 See above n. 56. 
77 See, e.g., ISDA, ISDA Comments on the Introduction of Netting Provisions into Russian Legislation (6 April 
2011): available at http://www2.isda.org/search?headerSearch=1&keyword=russia  
78 T. Porter, ‘Technical Systems and the Architecture of Transnational Business Governance’ (2013) Regulation 
& Governance (forthcoming). 
79 ISDA, Letter to European Banking Federation on a European Master Agreement for Financial Transactions 
(19th June 1998) [http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/European-Master-Agreement-for-Financial-Tansactions-
19Jun99.pdf].   
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perhaps not surprising that such competitors have, to date, not managed to seriously threaten 
ISDA’s space. Evidently and importantly, states have also played a role in incubating ISDA’s dominant 
regulatory role in the sense that states have, at the very least, traditionally been ‘facilitative’80 of 
ISDA. Overall therefore, it is clear that the private element (articulated through ISDA) of the broader 
regulatory regime for OTC derivatives is not ‘anational’. Instead, ISDA could be described as ‘beyond, 
but not without, the nation state’.81 Ultimately, ISDA does not set industry standards and norms 
which operate in a vacuum. Rather, ISDA appears to be engaging in what David Snyder might 
characterise as a form of ‘private lawmaking’ which has the capacity to clearly affect both members 
and non-members and thus can be considered to have ‘the effect of law’.82 And, as Ralf Michaels has 
observed, nation states may attempt to ‘domesticate this potentially subversive development 
through the incorporation of the norms that are created’. 83  
In principle, the fallout from the GFC theoretically had the potential to challenge this dynamic, 
especially ISDA’s focal role. But, as will be illustrated, what actually occurred following the GFC was 
perhaps closer to ‘institutional layering’ in many respects.84 In other words, due to its dominance 
and perhaps the perceived costs associated with creating an entirely new regulatory regime, ISDA 
was actually endowed with new responsibilities by public actors, exemplified by the establishment of 
the DCs. This effectively added adjudication and interpretative responsibilities with respect to a 
systemically important segment of the OTC derivatives markets to ISDA’s existing regulatory 
repertoire, which already included standard-setting, norm promotion and advisory functions. Before 











                                                          
80 On the facilitative role of states see, e.g., R. Wai, ‘Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a 
Contested Global Society’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 471, at 475.   
81 For discussion see, e.g., R. Michaels, ‘The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State’ (2007) 14 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 447   
82 D. Snyder, ‘Private Lawmaking’ (2003) 64 Ohio State Law Journal 371-448. 
83 R. Michaels, ‘The Re-Statement of Non-State Law: the State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge From Global 
Legal Pluralism’ (2005) 51 The Wayne Law Review 1210-1259. 
84 Büthe, above n.73, at 16. 
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d) Derivatives, ISDA and the GFC 
The GFC was not the first market crisis which featured derivatives trading gone awry,85though its 
severity arguably does distinguish it from previous panics.86 It is unlikely that the GFC will be the last 
market disruption to have a derivatives-related hue either.87 But it is also generally accepted that 
OTC derivatives did not, in and of themselves, prompt the collapse of major institutions and trigger 
the GFC.88 Instead, amongst other matters, the nature and extent of securitisation and related OTC 
derivatives’ deployment89; the resulting interconnectedness between systemic market 
participants90; informational asymmetries91; the form and implementation of pre-GFC public 
                                                          
85 See, e.g., P.M. Garber, ‘Famous First Bubbles’ (1990) 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives 35; R. Lowenstein, 
When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management (New York: Random House, 2000).    
86 See, e.g., G.B. Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012); C.M. Reinhardt and K.S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009).  
87 For instance the more recent JPMorgan Chase ‘Whale Trades’ generated some concern in the derivatives 
markets. See, e.g., US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and 
Abuses (15 March 2013): available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chase-whale-trades-a-case-history-of-
derivatives-risks-and-abuses; H.T.C. Hu, ‘Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information”, and the SEC 
Disclosure Paradigm’ (2012) 90 Texas Law Review 1601. 
88 V. Reinhart, ‘A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Financial Crisis in 2008’ (2011) 25 Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 71. 
89 See, e.g., G.B. Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007 (Yale 
University and National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, May 2009): available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401882  
90 See, e.g., R.M. Lastra, ‘Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability’ (2011) 6 Capital Markets Law Journal 197. 
91 See, e.g., R. Bartlett III, ‘Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivatives Disclosures 
During the Financial Crisis’ (2010) 36 Journal of Corporation Law 1.  
                                 


















regulatory frameworks92; and the idiosyncrasies of human93 (mostly male)94 actors coalesced to 
stoke the GFC. ISDA forcefully argues that the fallout from certain institutional implosions, such as 
that of Lehman Brothers,95 have ultimately been less traumatic for the OTC derivative markets than 
might originally have been anticipated.96 In Lehman’s case, ISDA largely attributes this to Lehman’s 
observance of OTC derivative market risk management practices and the operation of ISDA’s own 
Master Agreement-related close-out processes.97  
Nevertheless, the distresses of other OTC derivative market players, such as insurance giant 
American International Group (AIG), were patently different. ISDA, as well as other observers, tend 
to characterise AIG’s predicament as somewhat sui generis. While the proximate reasons for AIG’s 
collapse have been extensively outlined elsewhere,98 it is clear that AIG (specifically its Financial 
Products division) engaged in a considerable degree of speculative activity in the CDS markets99 and 
at the same time did not observe prudent margining (collateral) practices.100 This significantly 
contributed to a pooling of risk within AIG and the creation of systemically important 
interconnections, which AIG was unable to extricate itself from as the GFC flared up in 2007 and 
2008.101  
                                                          
92 See, e.g., E.K. Gerding, ‘Code, Crash and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk 
Models and the Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 84 Washington Law Review 127.   
93 See, e.g., D.C. Langevoort, ‘Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the 
Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking’ (2011) 96 Cornell Law Review 1209; S. Rosen, ‘The 
Economics of Superstars’ (1981) 71 American Economic Review 845; R.H. Thaler and E.J. Johnson, ‘Gambling 
with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice’ (1990) 36 
Management Science 643. 
94 See, e.g., See, e.g., C.L. Apicella et al., ‘Testosterone and Financial Risk Preferences’ (2008) 29 Evolution and 
Human Behaviour 384; J.M. Coates and J. Herbert, ‘Endogenous Steroids and Financial Risk Taking on a London 
Trading Floor’ (2008) 105 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
6167; E. Prugl, ‘”If Lehman Brothers Had Been Lehman Sisters...”: Gender and Myth in the Aftermath of the 
Financial Crisis’ (2012) 6 International Political Sociology 21; C.S. Chung, ‘From Lily Bart to the Boom Boom 
Room: How Wall Street’s Social and Cultural Response to Women has Shaped Securities Regulation’ (2010) 33 
Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 176.  
95 For general discussion see, e.g., Satyajit Das, In the Matter of Lehman Brothers, 59 WILMOTT 20 (2012). 
96Though of course that is not to say that there were no negative effects. See, e.g., N. Dumontaux and A. Pop, 
‘Understanding the Market Reaction to Shockwaves: Evidence from the Failure of Lehman Brothers’ (2013) 
Journal of Financial Stability (forthcoming). 
97 ISDA, Non-Cleared OTC Derivatives: Their Importance to the Global Economy (March 2013): available at 
http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/studies/  
98 See, e.g., US Government Accountability Office, Financial Crisis: Review of Federal Reserve System Financial 
Assistance to American International Group plc. (Report to Congressional Requesters: September 2011): 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585560.pdf; W.K. Sjostrum Jnr., ‘The AIG Bailout’ (2009) 66 
Washington and Lee Law Review 943.  
99 R.M. Stulz, ‘Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis’ (2010) 24 Journal of Economic Perspectives 73, at 83. 
100 See ISDA above n. 97. 
101 On the GFC generally see, e.g., E. Helleiner, ‘Understanding the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons 
for Scholars of International Political Economy’ (2011) 14 Annual Review of Political Science 67; K.T. Jackson, 
‘The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a View from a Moral-Cultural Mental Model’ (2010) 33 
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 735; A.E. Wilmarth Jnr., ‘The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis’ (2009) 41 Connecticut Law Review 963; S.T. 
Omarova, ‘The Quiet Metamorphis: How Derivatives Changed the Business of Banking’ (2009) 63 University of 
Miami Law Review 1041; M.K. Brunnermeier, ‘Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008’ (2009) 
23 Journal of Economic Perspectives 77. 
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Accordingly, while AIG’s specific situation may have technically been sui generis, the fact remains 
that AIG’s foray into the CDS markets and subsequent difficulties generated negative externalities. 
US authorities were compelled to support AIG with public funding, thereby also ensuring that AIG’s 
outstanding obligations on its OTC derivatives portfolio were honoured.102 In sum, the rescue of AIG 
generated a social cost. Of course, AIG was not the only financial institution to require publicly-
funded assistance in the throes of the GFC but is illustrative for present purposes insofar as its 
exposure to CDS’s was a key factor in its collapse. 
In the wake of the GFC and related institutional and market failures, the G20 nations resolved to 
overhaul infrastructure in the OTC derivatives markets.103 This agenda, which is being monitored by 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB)104, demands, inter alia, increased central clearing and/or exchange 
(or platform) trading of OTC derivatives where appropriate, as well as enhanced risk management 
practices and public reporting generally. At time of writing, G20 jurisdictions are at various stages of 
implementation, with the largest US105 and EU106 markets most advanced. Aside from these direct 
market infrastructure reforms, other elements of public regulatory reform on both sides of the 
Atlantic are also likely to impinge on the manner and extent to which certain banking entities will be 
permitted to engage in OTC derivative trading107; as per the so-called ‘Volcker’ and ‘Swaps Push-Out’ 
Rules in the US108 and, potentially, a bank ‘ring-fencing’ initiative at EU level.109 The EU has also 
                                                          
102 For details see, e.g., US Office of the Special Inspector General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
Quarterly Report to Congress (30 January 2010), p. 9: available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/January2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf; ISDA, 
Counterparty Credit Risk Management in the US Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets (August 2011): available 
at http://www2.isda.org/search?headerSearch=1&keyword=monoline  
103 G20, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (24-25 September 2009) (on file with authors). 
104 FSB, OTC Derivatives: available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_publications/tid_149/index.htm . 
105 Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 4173 (2010) 
(US). For information on implementing rules see, e.g., CFTC, Dodd-Frank Act: available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/index.htm; SEC, SEC Final Rules: available at  
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.shtml  
106 Under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ L 201/1 (‘European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation’); European Commission, Investment Services Directive – Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID): available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid_en.htm. For information on 
implementing regulations see, e.g., European Commission, Derivatives/EMIR: available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/derivatives/#maincontentSec1.  
107 For discussion see, e.g., J.T.S. Chow and J. Surti, Making Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It? (IMF 
Working Paper 11/236, November 2011): available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11236.pdf; A. Blundell Wignall, G. Wehinger and P. Slovik, 
‘The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal with what Banks Do’ (2009) OECD Journal, Financial Market 
Trends (Issue 2). 
108 For discussion of these measures see, e.g., C.K. Whitehead, ‘The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial 
Markets’ (2011) 1 Harvard Business Law Review 39; C.T. Fowler, ‘The Swaps Push Out Rule: An Impact 
Assessment’ (2011) 15 North Carolina Banking Institute 205; R.S. Bloink, ‘Does the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform Act Rein in Credit Default Swaps? An EU Comparative Analysis’, 89 (2011) Nebraska Law Review 587. 
109 European Commission, Final Report of the High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU 




issued a (somewhat controversial)110 regulation specifically concerned with short selling and CDS 
which elaborates certain restrictions and notification requirements for purely speculative 
(‘uncovered’) sovereign CDS, subject to exemptions.111  
This is only a high-level snapshot of the array of public regulatory reforms now underway in the 
financial sector. However, perhaps tellingly, the market infrastructure reform agenda has not sought 
to fundamentally challenge certain norms which became embedded in the OTC derivatives markets 
since the late 1980s, and which are important to ISDA. For example, OTC derivatives trading will 
continue, in general,112 to operate outside the purview of gambling and insurance laws in major 
jurisdictions, irrespective of the economic purpose of transactions.113 Overall therefore, public actors 
have not ‘thrown out the baby with the bathwater’, especially given that ISDA has, for instance, 
been utilised by major public regulatory authorities as a conduit for communicating with major 
market participants on the implementation of market infrastructure reforms. In turn, ISDA has 
reorganised its internal structures in order to streamline these interactions and to prepare its 
members for incoming regulatory reforms,114 as well as seeking to afford a stronger voice to ‘buy 
side’ members and other relevant stakeholders.  
It is thus clear that ISDA, for its part, has at least outwardly embraced the general objectives of 
public regulatory reform,115 though has also not hesitated to robustly challenge aspects of 
implementation, particularly through its revamped public relations machine.116 Moreover, certain 
reforms in the OTC derivatives markets have arguably seen ISDA actually increase its influence in 
some respects; exemplified by the establishment of the DCs. This influence and retention of 
‘regulatory share’117 has, however, occasionally brought with it certain pressures and expectations 




                                                          
110 See, e.g., International Monetary Fund, ‘Chapter 2: A New Look at the Role of Sovereign Credit Default 
Swaps’, Global Financial Stability Report (April 2013): available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2013/01/pdf/c2.pdf  
111 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on Short 
Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps [2012] OJ L 86/1. 
112 Although individual derivative contracts can theoretically fall foul of common law and/or legislative 
provisions nonetheless. See, e.g, K. Blizzard, The Law of Financial Derivatives in Ireland (Roundhall: Dublin 
2012). 
113 See, e.g., Biggins and Scott above n. 59. See also, e.g., L.A. Stout, ‘Uncertainty, Dangerous Optimism and 
Speculation: An Inquiry into Some Limits of Democratic Governance’ (2012) 97 Cornell Law Review 1177; T.L 
Hazen, ‘Disparate Regulatory Regimes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, 
Gambling and Insurance’ (2005) 24 Annual Review of Banking and Financial Law 376. 
114 ISDA, IIGC Committees: available at http://www2.isda.org/committees/iigc-committees/; ISDA, Protocol 
Management: available at  http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/about-isda-
protocols/  
115 See, e.g., ISDA, ISDA Overview 2013: Global Derivatives – More Challenge Ahead (19 April 2013): available at 
http://www2.isda.org/  
116 See, e.g., ISDA, Newsroom: available at http://www2.isda.org/newsroom/  
117 See J. Black, Legitimacy and the Competition for Regulatory Share (LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 
14/2009): available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1424654  
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III. The Emergence and Significance of the ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations 
Committees   
 
As the GFC began to bite in March 2008, the US President’s Working Group on Financial Markets118 
(PWG) issued a policy statement outlining its assessment of the roots of market turmoil and 
recommendations for addressing it.119 The prevailing industry settlement process for credit 
derivatives was amongst the issues which attracted the attention of the PWG.  
a) Settlement Concerns 
The PWG policy statement noted risks relating to settlement backlogs, particularly in credit 
derivatives, which had occurred prior to the GFC. The potential implications of this cannot be 
underestimated. For instance, it has been highlighted that for every 100 credit derivative contracts 
entered into by a major dealer bank in 2005, there were approximately 1,000 ‘aged unconfirmed’ 
trades outstanding.120 Patently, this generated a degree of legal uncertainty, as well as broader risk-
related concerns. Accordingly, under public regulatory pressure and the threat of intervention the 
industry, spearheaded by ISDA, undertook to reduce confirmations backlogs, particularly through 
increased automation processes. By 2007 the industry had largely achieved this across many product 
classes, including in credit derivatives.121   
While acknowledging industry efforts with respect to trade ‘compression’, the PWG harboured 
concerns that market participants had not achieved a ‘steady state’; noting unnerving spikes in 
backlogs of unconfirmed trades in credit derivatives in July and August 2007.122 The PWG also 
outlined its broader reservations in relation to industry settlement processes for CDS. Prior to the 
GFC, CDS market participants retained a degree of flexibility as to how exactly a contract could be 
settled upon the occurrence of a triggering ‘credit event’. Market participants could decide on a 
case-by-case basis as to whether they preferred ‘physical settlement’, requiring protection buyers to 
actually deliver defaulted securities to the protection seller in return for CDS payout, or traditional 
‘cash settlement’. ISDA had developed a ‘voluntary auction protocol’ prior to the GFC seeking to 
streamline cash settlement processes but it had not been adopted industry-wide at the onset of the 
GFC.  
Such divergences in settlement processes presented a particular problem for systemically important 
dealer banks123 acting as market-makers in CDS transactions. Dealers attempting to ensure that their 
intermediated transactions were ‘offsetting’ from a risk-management perspective could be fatally 
                                                          
118 Comprising the US Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
119US Treasury, Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments: The President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets (13 March 2008): available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-
mkts/Documents/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf (hereinafter ‘PWG Report’). 
120 D. Duffie, T. Lubke and A. Li, Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure (Milton Friedman 
Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2010-002, January 2010): available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534981  
121 See, e.g., S. Listokin-Smith, Meta-Regulation of OTC Derivatives Contracts Post Reform (Working Paper, 
November 2009): available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1499964  
122 PWG Report above n. 119, p. 19. 
123 On the modalities of dealer failure see, e.g., D. Duffie, ‘The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks’ (2010) 24 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 51.  
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undermined if transactions were not settling in a consistent manner.124 In the midst of fraught 
conditions in early 2008, the PWG was thus concerned about ‘the market impact such choices could 
have if multiple credit events were to occur simultaneously’.125 Therefore, in the broader context of 
standardisation and preparations for increased central clearing of derivatives the PWG 
recommended that: 
‘Supervisors should urge the industry to promptly amend standard credit derivative trade documentation 
to provide for cash settlement of obligations stemming from a credit event, in accordance with the terms 
of the cash settlement protocol that has been developed but not yet incorporated into standard 
documentation’.126 
 
On foot of this, as well as subsequent nudging by the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group (ODSG),127 
ISDA promulgated the ‘Big Bang’ and ‘Small Bang’ Protocols (hereinafter ‘the Protocols’). The 
Protocols essentially aimed to ‘hardwire’ the ‘auction mechanism’ into CDS contracts in order to 
ensure standardised cash settlement and interpretation processes.128 The saliency of new 
interpretation processes under the Protocols is of particular interest for the purposes of this chapter.  
Prior to the Protocols, divergences in settlement patterns were not the only concerns for policy 
makers. Disagreements between counterparties as to whether a triggering event had occurred in the 
first place also stoked legal, as well as economic, risk and occasionally prompted litigation; for 
instance following a debt restructuring exercise by Argentina in the early 2000s.129 Therefore, in 
conjunction with streamlined settlement processes, ISDA’s contractual Protocols also established 
centralised dedicated bodies which are responsible for issuing decisions as to whether triggering 
events have or have not occurred for the purposes of relevant CDS contracts.  These bodies are 
known as the Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees (DCs). 
b) Mechanics of the ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees  
The DCs are governed by rules drawn up by ISDA, aspects of which are periodically updated to 
reflect emerging market trends or demands.130 There are five regional DCs.131 ISDA acts as a non-
voting secretary to all of them. Hence, strictly speaking there is a distinction between the DCs and 
ISDA itself, though as has been observed elsewhere: ‘assuming the process works as advertised, DC 
decisions over time should track ISDA preferences’.132  
                                                          
124 ISDA, The ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees (May 2012): available at http://dc.isda.org/  
125 PWG Report above n. 119, p. 19. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Under the coordination of the US Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FNY) and also comprising the US 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, New York State Banking 
Department, Connecticut State Banking Department, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, French Prudential Supervisory Authority, 
German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, Japanese Financial Services Agency, Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority and UK Financial Services Authority (now restructured): 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html  
128 ISDA, Auction Hardwiring: available at 
http://www.isda.org/companies/auctionhardwiring/auctionhardwiring.html  
129 See, e.g., S. Choi and M. Gulati, ‘Contract as Statute’ (2006) 104 Michigan Law Review 1129.   
130 ISDA, DC Rules: available at http://www.isda.org/credit/revisedcrules.html  
131 Americas, Asia excluding Japan, Australia-New Zealand, Europe and Japan. 
132 A. Gelpern and M. Gulati, ‘CDS Zombies’ (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law Review 347, at 363. 
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The DCs are composed of ten voting derivatives dealers and five voting non-dealers serving on 
rotation, as well as two non-voting consultative dealers and two non-voting consultative non-
dealers. Central clearinghouses (CCPs) have also been afforded ‘observer’ status on the DCs.133 
Membership of the DCs is reviewed annually.134 Dealer membership is contingent on aggregate CDS 
trading volumes both globally and in the geographical market of the relevant DC, with reference to 
market data registered with Depository Trust Clearing Corporation (DTCC).135 Non-dealer members 
are selected on the basis of their size. 
Membership of each regional DC is on an ‘institutional’ rather than ‘person-specific’ basis. ISDA 
stresses that DC members are also expected to fully adhere to prevailing legal and regulatory 
obligations, for instance on insider trading and market manipulation.136 Fundamentally, the DCs are 
charged with adjudicating, ad-hoc, on standard questions (‘Potential DC Issue’)137 submitted to them 
by CDS market participants (‘Eligible Market Participants’ and ‘Eligible CCPs’). These questions 
typically relate to whether a particular triggering event has occurred with respect to a reference 
entity (for instance a corporate or sovereign) in accordance with ISDA’s Credit Derivatives Definitions 
and, if so, whether a settlement auction should be held; along with other auction-related modalities. 
It is necessary for a submitter (‘Eligible Market Participant’) to be party to a CDS contract 
incorporating the Protocols (‘Relevant Transaction’).138 It is possible for questioners to shield their 
identity by submitting a so-called ‘General Interest Question’.139 
An ISDA DC can, inter alia, decline to consider requests which are deemed to purely relate to a 
bilateral dispute between two market participants.140 Most questions must be accepted by at least 
one DC Voting Member,141 which is intended to filter frivolous issues. Where votes proceed, they are 
taken on the basis of publicly available information142 and contingent upon whether a particular 
credit or restructuring event is deemed to have occurred in accordance with the relevant ISDA Credit 
Derivatives Definitions. The DCs are required to reach an 80 per cent supermajority in decisions.143 If 
a DC fails to reach such a majority on a particular question, or if it voluntarily elects on certain 
matters, a question may be referred to a panel of external reviewers. External review panels are 
drawn from a pool of lawyers, retired judges, academics and other experts who can hear legal 
arguments and issue a decision.144  
DCs are not mandated to accompany their ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ decisions with detailed reasoning, though 
this is not precluded either.145 However, in August 2012 ISDA amended the DC Rules to facilitate the 
                                                          
133 Sections 1.6-1.8, DC Rules above n. 130. 
134 See ISDA, ISDA Announces Annual Determinations Committees Outcome (28 March 2013): available at 
http://www2.isda.org/news/isda-announces-annual-determinations-committees-outcome0 
135 Section 1.3, DC Rules above n. 130. 
136 ISDA, DC Paper above n. 114. 
137 Section 2.1(a), DC Rules above n. 130. 
138 Section 1.1(a), DC Rules above n. 130. 
139 Section 2.1(a), DC Rules above n. 130. 
140 Section 2.2(a), DC Rules above n. 130. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Section 2.1(b) and 3.1(a), DC Rules above n. 130. 
143 Section 2.3(a), DC Rules above n. 130. 
144 See, generally, Section 4, DC Rules above n. 130. 
145 Section 2.5(v), DC Rules above n. 130.  
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publication of a summary ‘Meeting Statement’,146 though the informational value of these 
statements may vary somewhat from case to case.147 Nonetheless, external review panels are 
seemingly expected to prepare a summary and analysis of their decisions and for these to be 
published by ISDA,148 though it is worth noting that the external review process is rarely invoked. 
c) Private Governance, Public Implications: The Regulatory and Normative Salience of the DCs 
 
The establishment of the DCs presents an interesting case study given that, in the final analysis, they 
emerged in response to pressures from public actors. In fact, the overall auction hardwiring process, 
of which the DCs form part, was explicitly welcomed by key public regulators.149 But, 
notwithstanding the potential for the DCs to exert third party effects (including for sovereigns), 
public actors did not demonstrate an interest in becoming involved in the DC process per se; thereby 
implicitly delegating that space to private self-regulation.150  
The concentrated nature of the OTC derivative markets, particularly on the dealer bank side, is 
relevant in attempting to contextualise the DCs. A theory put forth by Daniel Mügge may be quite 
instructive in this respect.151 Mügge reasons that where industries become dominated by a group of 
‘producer’ firms, particularly those which organise themselves through trade associations, they can, 
despite exogenous shocks, be well positioned to define aspects of regulatory reform agendas from 
the outset. Or, as Mügge puts it, ‘suggest “solutions” to problems they themselves helped define’.152 
Accordingly, where dominant firms are faced with regulatory overhaul they may be capable of 
successfully warding off public intervention in certain complex areas (in this case CDS 
determinations) by offering ‘”tightened” self-regulation in return for public “oversight”’.153  
Through this, private actors can seek to construct a ‘cognitive and political community, taking the 
role of the creator of the rules of the game’.154 However, the success of this endeavour can be 
uncertain. Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner suggest that the creation of ‘new rules of the game’ in a 
technical market (such as OTC derivatives) still might not ‘be expected to favour the adhesion of 
other actors who feel technically handicapped and uncertain about the potential opportunism of a 
small group of active promoters’.155 Predictably, the composition of, and powers assumed by, the 
                                                          
146 [http://www2.isda.org/news/isda-publishes-amendments-to-the-credit-derivatives-determinations-
committees-rules-to-further-improve-transparency].  
147 Compare ISDA, Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Credit Event Determination 
(http://dc.isda.org/documents/2013/02/emea_determinations_committee_decision_13022013_ibrc.pdf) and 
SNS Bank NV Credit Event Determination 
(http://dc.isda.org/documents/2013/02/emea_determinations_committee_decision_13022013-sns-2.pdf).  
148 Section 4.6(f), DC Rules above n. 130. 
149 OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group, New York Fed Welcomes CDS Auction Hardwiring (12 March 2009): 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/ma090312.html  
150 It could perhaps be suggested that this represented a ‘regulatory licence’ bestowed on ISDA by public 
actors. On the concept of regulatory licenses see F. Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets: Two 
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies’ (1999) 77 Washington University Law Quarterly 619. 
151 D. Mügge, ‘Private-Public Puzzles: Inter-firm Competition and Transnational Private Regulation’ (2006) 11 
New Political Economy 177. 
152 Ibid, at 185. 
153 Ibid. 
154 I. Huault and H. Rainelli-Le Montagner, ‘Market Shaping as an Answer to Ambiguities: The Case of Credit 




DCs provoked debate in certain quarters from the outset. In particular, the potential for conflicts of 
interest on the DCs attracted comment. A senior individual at a major international law firm 
summed up the challenge facing the DCs as follows: 
‘The DC is new, so any time there is a grey area you're going to get tension between dealers and buy side. 
But the DC has helped bring some certainty to the process, and it's a massive improvement on each 
individual party making its own decision and people holding off in the market to see what others do’.156 
 
Another derivative market participant has observed: 
 
‘It’s fair to say there is a concern that somebody might be biased towards their book, but in reality it’s 15 
firms making the decision, and the net effect tends to be pretty neutral. If someone’s arguing something 
clearly biased, they’ll lose all credibility. People know there is a huge public and regulatory focus on the DC, 
and no one wants to be that person’.157 
ISDA itself has also mounted a defence of the DCs on the basis that the vast majority of questions 
considered by the DCs are technical, straightforward and efficiently settled; that the 80 per cent 
supermajority mitigates conflicts of interests; and DC members are, in any event, obligated to 
observe relevant public regulations, such as anti-manipulation provisions. On the face of it, ISDA’s 
contentions carry merit insofar as the vast majority of the determinations issued by the DCs do seem 
to attract little or no public comment or interest. Aside from this, market participants have also 
questioned what other alternative structure could be viable, as expressed in the following terms: 
‘If you want a product that everyone can trade that isn't reliant on bilateral triggers then you need a public 
committee. And it makes sense for the people most interested in the product to be on that’.158 
Others have been considerably less charitable regarding the DC mechanism. For instance, Lisa 
Pollack, writing for the Financial Times, observed the following at the height of the DC for Europe’s 
lengthy deliberations as to whether a CDS credit event occurred following the nationalisation of 
Dutch institution SNS Reaal:159 
‘These guys can vote however they wish, it’s not that they are subject to any law other than that which 
they set for themselves (hush, hush now, financial stability is safe with them)...unlike the real, legal, world, 
the committee members are not obligated to abide by any precedents they set. So the concern about going 
against previous decisions is a question of fashion alone’.160 
Aside from this ongoing debate regarding the efficiency and predictability of the DC mechanism, 
there have clearly been instances where DC determinations, as well as the background dynamics of 
those determinations, have triggered a wider public interest and exerted identifiable third party 
effects. This has especially been the case in relation to determinations which have involved more 
complex questions and, in particular, where the reference entity has been a sovereign or a publicly 
                                                          
156 C. Whittall, ‘IFR – Defending the ISDA Determinations Committee’, Reuters (8 August 2011): available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/08/08/derivatives-isda-dc-ifr-idUKL6E7J81Z720110808  
157 C. Whittall, ‘Dealers Defend Committee’s Record as Restructuring Event Put in Play’, International Financing 
Law Review (5 August 2011): available at http://www.ifre.com/dealers-defend-isda-committees-record-as-
restructuring-event-put-in-play/648065.article  
158 Ibid. 
159 See ISDA, Credit Event: SNS Bank NV: available at http://dc.isda.org/cds/sns-bank-nv/ . 
160 L. Pollack, ‘The Non-Precedent-Setting, Own Law-Making, Secretive CDS Committee is having a Seriously 
Bad Month’, Financial Times (13 February 2013). 
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supported financial institution. In these cases it is evident that determinations of the ISDA DCs can 
be ‘socially significant’. 
i) Greece  
Perhaps one of the most controversial and high profile recent examples of a DC becoming embroiled 
in an event of public interest was in the context of the ‘quasi-voluntary’ Greek sovereign debt 
restructuring exercise with private creditors161 which came to a head in March 2012.162 Given the 
relative opacity and size of the CDS markets, and resulting interconnectedness amongst systemically 
important participants, the public policy dilemma was stark.163 And it quickly became clear to public 
policy makers and CDS market participants alike that the DC for Europe occupied a pivotal position in 
this saga. Ultimately, in March 2012 and following the activation of retroactive collection action 
clauses (CACs)164 by the Greek authorities (binding private creditors holding Greek law-governed 
bonds) the DC for Europe determined that a restructuring credit event had occurred for the 
purposes of Greek CDS’s.165 But, as Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati have illustrated,166 this 
determination appears to have been preceded by a considerable degree of background jockeying 
amongst public and private stakeholders, leading to periods of uncertainty and intriguing incidents, 
worth exploring here. 
In July 2011, at an earlier stage in negotiations on this restructuring exercise, ISDA published a 
‘Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A’ on its website which, inter alia, explained the DC process as well as the 
usual criteria for a restructuring credit event to occur. By way of a further update issued in October 
2011 ISDA  suggested that, while it was premature for a DC determination on the matter, it 
appeared to ISDA that the terms of a potential restructuring which were being discussed at that 
particular time were unlikely to constitute a ‘restructuring credit event’ triggering CDS contracts.167 
Gelpern and Gulati have branded this intervention ‘extraordinary’ in the circumstances and venture 
that it ‘could not have been made without consulting with – perhaps even some prodding from – at 
least some of the [ISDA] membership, European officials, and outside counsel called upon to advise 
the DCs’.168 
Subsequently, with fears that European Central Bank (ECB) and Eurosystem-held Greek bonds could 
be dragged into the emerging debt restructuring arrangement, February 2012 saw Greece swap 
central bank-held bonds for new ones, which only differed in their identification numbers. The 
ultimate objective was to ensure that these new identification numbers could be omitted from the 
                                                          
161 Represented by another powerful financial association, the Institute of International Finance (IIF): 
http://www.iif.com/  
162See, e.g., J. Zettlemeyer, C. Trebesch and M. Gulati, The Greek Debt Exchange: An Autopsy (Duke University 
Faculty of Law Working Paper, September 2012): available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5343&context=faculty_scholarship  
163 Gelpern and Gulati above n. 132, at 370. 
164 For general discussion of CACs see, e.g., M. Gulati and L. C. Buchheit, ‘Drafting a Model Collective Action 
Clause for the Eurozone’ (2011) 6 Capital Markets Law Journal 317. 
165 See ISDA, Credit Event: The Hellenic Republic (9 March 2012): available at http://dc.isda.org/cds/the-
hellenic-republic-3/  
166 Gelpern and Gulati above n. 132. 
167 ISDA, Greek Sovereign CDS: available at http://www2.isda.org/greek-sovereign-cds/  
168 Gelpern and Gulati above n. 132, at 374. 
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list of instruments which might be subject to the restructuring exercise (‘haircut’).169 However, the 
DC for Europe was petitioned for a determination as to whether this ostensibly nifty exercise 
effectively amounted to ‘subordination’ of other Greek creditors and, thus, whether it was a CDS-
triggering restructuring credit event. On 1 March 2012 the DC for Europe unanimously responded in 
the negative because, as far as it was concerned, the ‘specific fact pattern...does not satisfy either 
limb of the definition of Subordination as set out in the ISDA 2003 Credit Derivatives Definitions’.170  
This was not the first time the DC for Europe was asked to consider a potential subordination in the 
context of sovereign distress. Such a question had, for instance, arisen in 2011 in the wake of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance to Ireland (albeit in the context of a different 
fact pattern).171 The posture of the DC in the Greek case has been deemed by Gelpern and Gulati to 
be ‘defensible’ in a technical sense. However, they also contend that, in a practical sense, ‘no one 
with even a passing knowledge of the situation had any doubt that the only rationale for the ECB 
swap was to treat its bonds better than those held by private creditors’.172 In that same 
determination, the DC also confirmed that the passage of Greek legislation retroactively amending 
Greek law-governed bonds to insert CACs did not, in and of itself, amount to a restructuring credit 
event. This also caused consternation in certain quarters, which was acknowledged by the manager 
of a hedge fund which actually sat on the DC. He commented immediately afterwards: ‘If I were a 
buyer of protection on Greece and have [sic] seen the result this morning in terms of no protection, 
then I would be upset’.173  
In any event, the Greek authorities did subsequently activate the CACs and the DC for Europe duly 
confirmed on 9 March 2012 that this activation constituted a CDS-triggering restructuring credit 
event.  An auction would subsequently be held to settle the CDS obligations174 which turned out to 
be less problematic than was perhaps initially feared;175 though, nonetheless, given the controversy 
around certain aspects of the Greek event ISDA has since proposed certain revisions to its Credit 
Derivatives Definitions.176 
More generally, the Greek CDS event and background manoeuvrings carried clear implications for 
third party stakeholders and fuelled concerns amongst certain market participants regarding the 
appropriateness of the DC mechanism in these instances. The general challenge was summed up by 
one derivatives lawyer as follows: 
                                                          
169 Gelpern and Gulati above n. 132, at 378-380. 
170 ISDA, Credit Event: The Hellenic Republic (1 March 2012): available at http://dc.isda.org/cds/the-hellenic-
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‘Some people are certainly concerned they’re being manipulated by the dealers...On technical points, the 
DC is fine. The problem is for larger decisions like Greece...It’s not a perfect mechanism for big issues that 
affect a large amount of people to be decided by a small portion of the overall market’.177 
As has also been observed in an IOSCO report, while the sovereign CDS markets survived the Greek 
event it ‘brought to the forefront several doubts on the future of this market’.178 Additionally, in the 
immediate term this determination triggered socially significant ripples further afield.  
ii) KA Finanz  
A little known Austrian ‘bad bank’, KA Finanz had been siphoned off from Kommunalkredit Austria 
following its nationalisation by the Austrian Government in October 2008.179 KA Finanz houses the 
securities and CDS portfolio remaining in the wake of this demerger and has been charged with its 
‘structured rundown’.180 Following the Greek restructuring and determination of the ISDA DC on 9 
March 2012 KA Finanz issued a statement indicating that it would require further public funding 
support to cover its positions in Greek securities and CDS contracts.181 In its interim results for 2012 
KA Finanz (KF) thus confirmed: 
‘The debt restructuring measures for the Republic of Greece implemented in the first quarter of 2012 had a 
significant impact on KF...which could not be covered by KF’s capital base. To recapitalise KF, 
comprehensive capital measures, effective as of 31 December 2011, were agreed upon with the Republic 
of Austria...’.182 
Accordingly, KA Finanz illustrated how the impact of a DC determination could, due to the 
embedded legal significance of the Protocols across the CDS markets, directly affect a third party (i.e. 
the Austrian Government) and carry with it distributional implications. This is significant because, 
although the DCs can exert such third party effects, it does not necessarily follow that affected third 
parties have a right to input into the DC process. Put differently, despite the fact that a DC 
determination could negatively affect a failed bank under the Austrian Government’s (public) 
oversight (i.e. KA Finanz), the Austrian Government itself was not entitled to appear before the DC; 
should it theoretically have wished to attempt to influence the DC determination on Greek CDS from 
the outset. Nor was the Austrian Government entitled to appeal against the DC determination 
triggering Greek CDS, in comparison to a potential right of appeal against a decision of a court of 
law. 
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Therefore, KA Finanz was arguably illustrative of the fact that a DC decision can exert third party 
(distributional) implications for a range of stakeholders; including government actors which 
themselves may have little, or no, direct proximity to the DC process itself. In that sense, it could be 
posited that certain DC determinations can be ‘socially significant’. 
However, third party effects were not confined to the Greek event. Previous determinations can 
similarly be considered to have carried implications for public policy makers, as well as other 
challenges. An apt example was Bradford & Bingley. 
iii) Bradford & Bingley 
Coleen Baker has highlighted the case of Bradford & Bingley (B&B), a UK mortgage lender, which was 
nationalised by the UK Government in September 2008. As part of their strategy to deal with B&B, 
the UK authorities permitted B&B to defer meeting obligations on subordinated bonds. Such a 
course of action would not, in the view of the UK authorities, constitute a credit event which could 
frustrate B&B’s repayment of rescue funds received from the UK authorities.183 However, Morgan 
Stanley queried this with the DC for Europe which determined that a ‘failure to pay’ credit event had 
in fact occurred for the purposes of CDS contracts referencing B&B bonds, in accordance with ISDA’s 
Credit Derivatives Definitions.184  Baker brands this a ‘powerful example of the development of 
global private governance mechanisms and their potential impact on government actors’.185 Of 
further interest, in this case the petitioner (Morgan Stanley)186 also sat on the relevant DC and voted 
in favour of calling a credit event; arguably raising broader questions over whether it is appropriate 
for a questioner who may have a vested interest in a particular determination to actually sit on the 
panel issuing that determination. 
Overall, these selected events at least demonstrate that the DCs wield significant power to 
adjudicate on systemically important events in the financial markets; some with potentially public 
implications. Consequently, it is warranted to consider future prospects for the DCs in the context of 
wider regulatory reforms in the OTC derivatives markets. 
IV. Walking the Tightrope of Regulatory Reform 
In the wake of the GFC, public authorities across major trading jurisdictions have instigated 
significant overhaul of OTC derivative markets187; essentially with the objective of emulating key 
infrastructure already prevailing in the exchange-traded (ET) derivatives markets. With a view to 
mitigating risk and increasing transparency, an increased proportion of OTC derivatives will, where 
appropriate188, be channelled through central clearinghouses (CCPs) and/or traded on exchanges or 
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electronic platforms. OTC derivatives will also be reported to central trade registries and/or public 
authorities. Implementation of this prescription is already well underway in certain jurisdictions, 
particularly in the US.189 But a question arises as to precisely what role the DCs will continue to play 
in an environment where certain previously privately and bilaterally traded ISDA-governed CDS 
contracts will now be clearing through CCPs.  
Basically, central clearinghouses (CCPs) are entities which stand in the middle of OTC derivative 
transactions and thereby become the counterparty to each market participant using their services. 
CCPs aim to ensure prudent risk management of trades, as well as smooth post-trade settlement. 
CCPs will aim to mitigate risks by ensuring that contracts are, for instance, offsetting and making use 
of ‘multilateral netting’.190 CCPs are systemically important in their own right and sensitive to the 
failure of their members. Therefore, in order to underpin their own viability CCPs will thus demand 
that their members adhere to certain membership criteria.191 
As has been highlighted by Joanne Braithwaite, post-reform contractual arrangements in the OTC 
derivatives markets are therefore likely to differ somewhat depending on the status of the 
instruments and market participants in question.192 If a contract is clearable (or legally subject to the 
clearing obligation) and both counterparties are members of a relevant clearinghouse (i.e. are 
‘clearing members’), such instruments and post-trade arrangements are likely to be largely governed 
from the outset by the standard terms and rules of a particular CCP (which may not necessarily 
emulate ISDA contract terms).193  
However, due to the nature of CCP membership criteria and/or the precise implementation of the 
clearing prescription across jurisdictions,  not all market participants will be full clearing members  
and many may need to engage in so-called ‘indirect clearing’; in other words channel their trade 
through a market participant who is a full clearing member of a CCP. In this case, it seems possible 
that two contracts may exist, one between the client and the clearing member and another between 
the clearing member and the CCP.194 The first arrangement (i.e. between the client and the clearing 
member) could continue to be largely predicated on the ISDA Master Agreement and/or perhaps 
with some role for other contractual mechanisms; such as the ISDA-Futures Industry Association 
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(FIA) Cleared Derivatives Execution Agreement.195 The engagement between the clearing member 
and the CCP could be governed by the CCP’s own standard terms.196  
A substantial number of contracts will also not be clearing-eligible under public regulatory reforms 
and, although subject to increased capital and risk management (e.g. collateralisation) requirements, 
will continue to be traded privately and bilaterally under the ISDA Master Agreement. Specifically in 
relation to credit derivatives, including CDS, it seems likely at time of writing that a considerable 
number of these contracts will continue to be traded in this space.197 In fact, ISDA has suggested that 
a significant proportion of CDS contracts, including ‘single-name’ CDS, will not be eligible for central 
clearing.198  
Accordingly, there is little reason to suspect that non-cleared CDS will not continue to be governed 
by prevailing ISDA documentation and processes, including the DC mechanism. And it also seems 
likely that certain CDS contracts subject to a clearing obligation could, in theory at least, be governed 
by key aspects of the DC mechanism; if not by ISDA-inspired documentation and definitions more 
generally. This perspective is supported by the fact that CCPs have been co-opted onto certain ISDA 
DCs; albeit as observers.199 ISDA has also published amendments to its rules enabling CCPs to 
explicitly afford the DCs jurisdiction over cleared CDS.200 Taken together and despite broader market 
infrastructure reforms, these factors suggest that the ISDA DCs are likely to wield significant 
influence outside, and possibly within, clearing processes. 
Therefore, the ISDA DCs may continue to occupy a sensitive position in the financial markets. But 
this will also arguably force them to walk a somewhat precarious tightrope in the context of broader 
public regulatory reforms. On the one hand, ISDA may be anxious to maintain as much ‘regulatory 
share’201 as possible, while on the other avoid raising the hackles of public policy makers. However, 
as the Greek crisis has demonstrated, public threats to ISDA’s power may flare up from time to time, 
particularly in cases involving sovereigns which trigger a broader interest.202 Additionally, as has 
been demonstrated in other contexts, such as the interbank rate-setting controversy, socially 
important private governance arrangements are susceptible to public intervention in the event of 
perceived failures.203 Indeed, by time of writing ISDA itself had been drawn into this controversy by 
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virtue of a public regulatory investigation into ISDA’s own (hitherto little known) derivatives 
benchmark rate (‘ISDAFIX’).204  
The ISDA DCs will presumably be conscious that public intervention is a threat and thus remain 
cognisant of their potential influence and associated responsibilities. At time of writing public policy 
makers have not indicated that they are inclined to interfere with the DC process. Nonetheless, 
certain issues around third party implications and potential conflicts of interest may continue to 
haunt the DCs. As such, in the longer term it may be desirable for all stakeholders to consider the 
merits of further reform of overall institutional governance in these markets, as has already been 
proposed elsewhere.205 
Conclusions 
Regulatory arrangements for the OTC derivatives market serve to demonstrate the resilience of 
transnational private regulation, in a transnational business governance interactions (TBGI) 
environment subject both to the significant external shock of the global financial crisis, and intense 
pressure on governmental actors to demonstrate that they are acting effectively to reduce or 
eliminate the kinds of risk which created a global financial meltdown.206 How can such resilience be 
explained? It is not credible to think that policy makers might continue to think of OTC derivatives as 
a purely technical area, in which regulatory decision making at worst affects only bilateral interests 
of parties to transactions. The third party effects of the way in which contracts are written, the 
protections granted by legislation, and also the decisions of the Credit Derivatives Determinations 
Committees (DCs) are of great potential significance in a wide range of transactions. The lack of 
transparency associated with private arrangements and their impact has been a particular source of 
criticism.207  
An alternative explanation for the continuing acceptance of ISDA is, recognising the effects on 
interests, that a judgement has been made which affords priority to the expertise of those 
practitioners involved, and which is accepting of the mechanisms through which no one set of 
interests (whether individual, for example of a particular bank, or collective, for example of banks as 
a whole) is able to dominate decisions. There is an implicit delegation of power to make decisions of 
potentially great significance, but which in most cases secure little attention. 
In this case of TBGI between state and non-state actors, these occur in both operational and policy 
spheres. Operationally there is a strong stake for governments both directly in relation to 
determinations concerned with sovereign debt and indirectly in addressing fall-out, for example to 
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banks and sovereigns, arising from sovereign debt decisions. There is also a regulatory dimension to 
operational relationships, as decisions about CDS instruments affect public regulatory issues, such as 
compliance by banks and others with capital adequacy and other prudential requirements.  
At a policy level, interactions are concerned with the nature and extent of delegation to private 
governance institutions generally (including in this sphere not only ISDA and other trade 
associations, but also credit rating agencies, whose decisions affect creditworthiness and feed into 
public regulatory decision making), and to ISDA in particular. The delegation to ISDA over credit 
determinations is implicit, as if the structure has been thrown up as part of the market mechanism, 
requiring of intervention only where justified by market failure.  
Whilst continuing events associated with the global financial crisis (GFC) encourage stronger scrutiny 
by national and supranational governmental bodies of private governance arrangements such as 
ISDA, it is striking how embedded private governance arrangements remain. Indeed, the crisis was a 
key factor in further crystallising ISDA’s role through the systemization of CDS determinations, as it 
became increasingly important for such decisions to be made on a centralised basis, rather than on a 
bilateral and ad hoc basis. It is not clear that governmental actors would necessarily bring either 
greater legitimacy or expertise to the general task of the DCs. At the same time, whilst the function 
remains privately organised, it is nonetheless capable of exerting ‘socially significant’ third party 
effects in certain circumstances. This may continue to raise certain legitimacy and transparency 
issues, especially in cases where sovereigns and publicly supported financial institutions are at issue.  
As a private actor at the centre of a regulatory regime with significant features of TBGI, ISDA comes 
across as a survivor, able to adapt itself to changing conditions, external shocks and challenges to 
the legitimacy of private regulation engendered by the GFC. This characteristic, above all, perhaps 
demonstrates the essentially political character of such private governance arrangements, even 
where key private regulators may protest that their roles are primarily technical.208 
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